OHR introduced wide-ranging laws and amendments concerning priva tization, wages, and financial operations designed to maintain market reforms that would meet the demands of the IFIs for the privatization of public enterprises and socially owned assets.2 Indeed, the external ac tors are drawn into micromanagement in their efforts to implement this vision because they encounter resistance and prevarication.3 Obviously, the clientist and neoliberal mechanisms for managing investment, shares, and profits are dissimilar. But the normative assumptions of the external actors and the interests of domestic elites coincide in extracting profit from public goods and in fostering opportunities from privatiza tion and discrimination against social ownership. In this there is com mon ground between international and domestic parties as well as fric tion and resistance.
There has been limited critical research on the political economy of war-torn societies or on the dysfunctional aspects of neoliberalism in peace building.4 However, a critical theory perspective shows that the maneuvering and collaboration in BiH highlights not only contradic tions in the practice of neoliberalism but also the limitations of a para digm that configures society as an adjunct of the market. It contests the neoliberal discourse of norms that privilege global markets, the non interventionist state, and the discounting of political and social dynam ics.5 Further, external micromanagement stems from seeing collapsed statist economies as the dysfunctional "other," and from attempts to modify the corporatist systems and "criminal" behavior of local war en trepreneurs. But the external actors juggle between nation building and diminishing the state as an economic actor by privatizing essential serv ices and shifting responsibility for employment and welfare from the state to the individual. This has hardly alleviated a grim social and eco nomic situation that differentiates markedly between participants in the entrepreneurial economy and the excluded poor, unemployed, and wel fare dependent.
In the first part of this analysis I present a snapshot of the BiH economy after six years of peace. I then examine the prewar and war time aggrandisement of nationalists that carried over into the postwar settlements. In the next section I deal with the goals and basic mecha nisms of the external "protectors" and the interaction of neoliberalism and clientism, with a particular focus on the privatization process. Fi nally, I contend that the neoliberal model is dysfunctional in providing the social protection that war-torn societies such as BiH lack.
A Dire Economy
In 2001, six years after Dayton, the economic situation was officially described as "dire."6 The war had reduced per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to about 20 percent of its prewar level, and from this low base the economy then grew by an average of over 30 percent a year until 1999, mainly fueled by the donor programs, but with a gap between the Federation and the less buoyant Republika Srpska. (HPB) at a remarkably low price.25 A primary concern of prebendary elites is to control rents and government revenues for their own gain. turns from smuggling, the taxation of diasporas, and protection rackets.
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Their niche may be guaranteed by a clientist relationship with politi cians of a particular ethnic group, but unlike the nationalist politicians, they parody the ideals of multiethnicity so vaunted by the external ex ecutive powers by trading with any ethnic group to protect and further their spoils.
These economies are usually represented as deviations from an ideal standard of market behavior and a menace to the liberal agenda because they are beyond formal external control. To fix the gray and black economies as "criminal" and distorting is part of a discourse that assumes normality and legality are represented by the free market. Iron ically, in an investigation into a missing $1 billion of public funds in BiH in December 1999, former U.S. ambassador Robert Frowick played down the scandal with the argument that corruption also figured in his own country. 34 In a welfare vacuum, the gray and black economies clearly perform a service, providing the means of escape, sustenance, and employment. Undeclared work, for example, is part of a survival strategy in BiH, because regulated employment is heavily taxed and le gitimate earnings and welfare provision are inadequate even to provide for basic needs. Moreover, these economies are not parallel and com petitive, since they overlap and any particular economic unit may be en 
